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PROTECTING NATIONAL PARKS FROM DEVELOPMENTS
BEYOND THEIR BORDERS
The accumulated impact of such factors as population growth,1
acid rain, 2 and energy and resource development 3 are threatening the
sanctity of our nation's parks. As noted in a recent congressional
report, activities beyond our parks' boundaries are increasingly undermining the quality of the parks themselves:
Most of these great parks were at one time pristine areas
surrounded and protected by vast wilderness regions. Today, with their surrounding buffer zones gradually disappearing, many of these parks are experiencing significant
and widespread adverse effects associated with external
encroachment. . . . The most frequently identified external threats included: Industrial and commercial development projects on adjacent lands; air pollutant emissions,
often associated with facilities located considerable dis-"
tances from the affected parks; urban encroachment; and
roads and railroads.'
National -concern for the preservation of unique areas of the
American landscape was first clearly manifested in 1872 when Congress set aside over two million acres in the territories of Wyoming,
' Between 1970 and 1980, there were dramatic population increases in the mountain and Pacific northwest states where many of the major national parks are located.
In the mountain states, for example, population increases in the metropolitan areas
ranged from 15.4% (Wyoming) to 86% (Nevada), and increases in the nonmetropolitan
areas ranged from 13.8% (Montana) to 52.3% (Nevada). In all but two of the mountain states, the nonmetropolitan population grew by 25% or more. See BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, METROPOLITAN AND NON-METROPOLITAN

AREA POPULATION-STATES,

1960-1980,

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES (103d ed. 1982-83). Although population growth in nonmetropolitan areas
may be a more direct problem, urban population growth can also have a deleterious
impact by, for example, aggravating the problems of air and water pollution.
2 For surveys of the causes, consequences, and legal issues surrounding acid rain,
see generally Note, Acid Rain: Causes, Effects, and Remedies, 3 STAN. ENVTL. L.
Soc'y ANN. 118 (1980-81); Note, Umbrella Equities: Use of Federal Common Law
Nuisance to Catch the Fall ofAcid Rain, 21 URB. L. ANN. 143 (1981); Note, Controlling Acid Rain: The ClearAir Act and Federal Common Law Nuisance, 84 W. VA. L.
REV. 1135 (1982).

' See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980) (challenging
the Secretary of the Interior's failure to assert federal water rights in order to prevent
the construction in northern Arizona and southern Utah of energy projects that would
disrupt waters flowing through Grand Canyon National Park).
" H.R. REP. No. 170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1983).
(1189)

1190

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:1189

Montana, and Idaho to create Yellowstone National Park. 5 That action
was particularly remarkable in that the primary object of federal land
policy up until then had been to dispose of the government's vast holdings of public lands.6 In 1916, the federal commitment to preservation
was codified when Congress enacted legislation establishing a National
Park Service to oversee the growing network of national parks.7 The
wording of that statute, still in effect today, obligates the Park Service
"to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the
wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such
manner and by such means as will leave them, unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 8 Over the last six decades, our system
of national parks has expanded to include well over three hundred areas encompassing over one hundred million acres of land. Much of the
most beautiful and historically significant land in the United States is
thus entrusted to the care of the National Park Service.9
Congress has traditionally sought to endow each new park with
lands sufficient to surround and protect the focal points of the park.
Whenever the focal points have been threatened by outside activity, the
simplest and most effective response has been for the government to
acquire additional surrounding land as insulation.10 It is becoming
5 See Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 21-40 (1982)). The Act described the land set aside as "a public park or pleasuringground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people" and dictated that the Secretary of
the Interior promulgate rules and regulations to "provide for the preservation, from
injury or spoliation, of all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders
within said park, and their retention in their natural condition." 17 Stat. at 32-33. For
an early history of Yellowstone Park, see J. ISE, OUR NATIONAL PARK POLICY: A
CRITICAL HISTORY 13-50 (1961).
" See generally P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 1-32
(1968).
1 National Park Service Organic Act, 39 Stat. 535-36 (1916) (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-20g (1982)).
8 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
9 For a brief statistical summary of the National Park System, see W. EVERHART,
THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE app. B (1983). Everhart provides information by category on the number and acreage of national parks, national monuments, national
lakeshores, and other protected sites.
10 The government's most recent attempt to protect a park through land acquisition occurred in response to the disruption of Redwood National Park by neighboring
timber operations. Litigation eventually led to congressional action. The pertinent section of the governing statute, as amended in 1978, authorizes the Secretary to acquire
land from those who own land on the periphery of the park and on watersheds tributary to streams within the park "to afford as full protection as is reasonably possible to
the timber, soil, and streams." See 16 U.S.C. § 79c(e) (1982).
Many of the statutes establishing new national parks and recreation areas include
sections describing specific plots of land to be acquired in the future. See, for example,
detailed provisions as to acquisition procedures for several new national recreation areas: Golden Gate National Recreation Area, id. § 460bb-2; Gateway National Recreation Area, id. § 460cc-1.
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clearer, however, that this simple response is inadequate for long-term
park protection. Undeveloped land adjacent to parks is becoming increasingly scarce and prohibitively expensive."1 Moreover, the concept
of buffer protection, at least theoretically, knows no bounds. As more
than one critic has asked: "Where does the buffer end? Does it stretch
from the Atlantic to the Pacific?" 2
The first two parts of this Comment will focus on several alternatives to buffer zone protection for the national parks. Part I briefly
examines the limited effectiveness of the traditional approaches of nuisance and public trust doctrine in protecting the national parks. Part II
analyzes the limited role that direct congressional action has played in
addressing threats to specific parks. Part II then discusses and critiques
H.R. 2379,13 a bill currently pending in Congress and designed to increase the Secretary of the Interior's responsibilities to the parks. Finally, Part III suggests several amendments that will ensure that the
bill, when enacted, is adequate to the important task of protecting the
national parks from harmful developments beyond their borders.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

An analysis of the value of nuisance and public trust doctrine as
devices for protecting our national park system from developments beyond park boundaries is worth undertaking on several grounds. Both
doctrines have been used effectively in the recent past to address developments harmful to federal lands and interests. Although legislation
and judicial interpretation have limited their scope, these doctrines continue to be the subject of scholarly debate. Furthermore, the two doctrines provide mechanisms by which the judiciary might assume a role
in the protection of national parks. To the extent the role of the legislative process in addressing this problem is limited, such a mechanism for
judicial intervention is desirable.
A.

Nuisance Law

The Second Restatement of Torts defines a private nuisance as "a

"IFor a general

understanding of the difficulties involved in buffer protection, see
Sax, Buying Scenery: Land Acquisitions for the National Park Service, 1980 DUKE
L.J. 709; cf. Lambert, Private Landholdings In The National Parks: Examples From
Yosemite National Park and Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, 6 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 35 (1982) (endorsing land acquisition as best method for dealing with private
landholdings within national parks).
12 Battle Over the Wilderness, NEWSWEEK, July 25, 1983, at 22, 29 (quoting
Assistant Secretary of the Interior Ray Arnett).
13 H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See infra note 102.
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nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and en' and a public, nuisance as "an unreasonable interferjoyment of land,"14
ence with a right common to the general public."' 5 Whether one considers the government to be analogous to a private landowner in
possession of the national parks or whether one considers the use of
those parks to be a right common to all, nuisance theories would seem
to be ideally suited as authority for the government to bring lawsuits to
control the detrimental activities of property owners living adjacent to
the parks. Indeed, one commentator has stated that "the federal government has always had the power to enjoin activities that create nuisances
on federal lands." 6 Similarly, a federal district court recently asserted:
"The government has, with respect to its own lands, the rights of an
ordinary proprietor to maintain its possession and to prosecute trespassers. It may deal with such lands precisely as a private individual may
deal with his property."'' Despite these sweeping assertions, nuisance
cases involving the federal government as plaintiff have been relatively
scarce.
Nuisance actions typically involve disputes between neighboring
individual property owners and are litigated in state courts, subject to
state laws."8 In nuisance actions brought by the federal government,
however, the claims have traditionally been litigated in federal courts
under federal common law. 9 A typical example is the 1905 case of
United States v. Luce.Y° In Luce, the federal government initiated suit
against a Delaware Bay fish factory that was producing "offensive
14
's
10

§ 821D (1979).
Id. § 821B.
Tarlock, For Whom the National Parks? (Book Review), 34
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

255, 271 (1981) (reviewing J.

STAN.

L.

REV.

SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLEC-

TIONS ON THE NATIONAL PARKS (1980)).
17 United States v. Osterlund, 505 F.

Supp. 165, 167 (D. Colo. 1981) (citing
v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897)) (granting motion by United
summary judgment against a trespasser who for some years had inadvertently
farmed, and lumbered part of Arapahoe-Roosevelt National Forest), affd,
1267 (10th Cir. 1982).
18 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 571-612 (4th
ed. 1971).
19 Nuisance actions brought by the United States as landowner are virtually nonexistent in state court reporters. As examples of situations in which the United States
did take some action in state court, see Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229
(1850) (trespass action against an individual who was cutting trees on public lands
initiated by the United States'in the Superior Court of West Florida); Commonwealth
v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 195 n.1, 311 A.2d 588,
589 n.1 (1973) (in a case brought by Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to halt construction of a viewing tower adjacent to Gettysburg National Park, the Park Service Advisory Council "finally came out with a report recommending that the United States
government assist the Commonwealth in opposing the construction of the tower").
20 141 F. 385 (C.C.D. Del. 1905).
Camfield
States for
occupied,
671 F.2d
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odors" 21- to the discomfort of inhabitants of a federal quarantine station
located downwind. In issuing an injunction against the factory, the
court stated: "That the government, in the absence of a plain, adequate
and complete remedy at law has a right to maintain an injunction bill
to restrain a nuisance materially and injuriously affecting the occu22
pancy of its own property there can be no doubt."
- Although
the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins28 cut back on the federal common law, the decision did not
abrogate the federal common law of nuisance. In the 1970's, numerous
nuisance cases involving interstate pollution were brought, thus generating a substantial body of federal common law.2
A 1972 Supreme Court decision, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 5
paved the way. The suit was brought by the state of Illinois, which
claimed that a number of Wisconsin cities and sewerage commissions
were allowing improperly treated sewage to be discharged into Lake
Michigan."6 Justice Douglas's opinion for a unanimous Court stated
that federal courts, under general federal question jurisdiction,2 7 have
the power to order the abatement of interstate water pollution affecting
21
22

Id. at 390.
Id. at 419.

23 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For general discussions of federal common law, see
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And Of The New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383 (1964); Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024 (1967); Comment, Erie Limited: The Confines
of State Law in the Federal Courts, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 561 (1955).
As stated more recently by Justice Rehnquist, "When Congress has not spoken to
a particular issue, however, and when there exists a 'significant conflict between some
federal policy or interest and the use of state law,' . . . the Court has found it necessary, in a 'few and restricted' instances ... to develop federal common law." City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313-(1981) (citations omitted).
24

For collections of cases, see W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

§ 2.12

(1977); Annot., 29 A.L.R. FED. 137 (1976). For some of the early commentary on the
emergence of a federal common law cause of action for interstate pollution, see Comment, Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1972)
(arguing that courts are poorly qualified to make law in the environmental area but
well-qualified to apply appropriate remedies under environmental statutes); Note, Federal Jurisdiction-EnvironmentalLaw-Nuisance-State Ecological Rights Arising
Under Federal Common Law, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 597 (discussing origins of federal
common law of nuisance and examining post-Erie federal common law nuisance cases).
25 406 U.S. 91 (1972).

26 Id. at 93. The Court entertained the suit under its power of original jurisdiction over cases to which a state is a party. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. However, the
Court noted that the exercise of Supreme Court jurisdiction in such cases is not
mandatory and decided that this case had to be brought in federal district court. 406
U.S. at 108.
27 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) provided that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."
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navigable bodies of water: "We see no reason not to give 'laws' its natural meaning. . and therefore conclude that § 1331 [of title 28] jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law as well
as those of a statutory origin."28 The Court noted, however, that the
power to fashion federal common law is limited to situations "where
there is an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of
decision or where the controversy touches basic interests of
federalism."2 9
The Court went on to caution that "[ilt may happen that new
federal laws and new federal regulations may in time preempt the field
of common law of nuisance."8 0 In this case, however, the Court ruled
that the federal common law claim for abatement of the pollution was
not preempted by the Federal Water Pollution Control Acte" and remanded to the district court for consideration of the merits of the
claim.3 '
The Illinois v. City of Milwaukee decision spawned a series of related federal common law of nuisance cases during the 1970's."3 Notable among these, especially from the perspective of park protection, was
United States v. Atlantic-Richfield Co." In that case, the government
sued for a court order to decrease an aluminum reduction plant's emissions of fluoride. The government alleged that the emissions were damaging trees and wildlife in Montana's Flathead National Forest and
Glacier National Park. In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss,
the federal district court ruled that the federal common law of nuisance
406 U.S. at 100.
"9 Id. at 105 n.6.
SO Id. at 107.
Si Id. at 104. The statutory language that the Court considered appears at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1970 & Supp. 11 1972).
32 406 U.S. at 108. On remand, the district court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298, 302 (N.D. Ill. 1973). The case eventually reached the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which, after ordering extensive
supplementary briefing, substantially modified the district court's decree and remanded
the case with instructions to enter an injunctive order against the effluents consistent
with the circuit opinion. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979).
1S See, e.g., United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.J. 1973)
(government entitled to injunctive relief from dredging, filling, and construction activities of defendant in a navigable waterway in New Jersey), vacated on other grounds
and remanded with instructions to modify the injunction, 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel
Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (granting government's petition to restrain
steel producer from discharging wastes into Lake Michigan); United States v. Ira S.
Bushey & Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972) (granting government's request
for order that defendant take greater precautions to avoid oil spillages in Lake
Champlain).
' 478 F. Supp. 1215 (D. Mont. 1979).
28
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had not been abolished by federal statute."5 Within the last few years,
however, courts have ruled that federal legislation has preempted fed37
6
eral common law in litigation involving interstate water and air
pollution.
Although federal legislation has preempted federal common law in
the specific context of pollution, a more general body of federal common law of nuisance may remain intact. For example, the recent case
of United States v. County Board 8 involved an unsuccessful attempt by
the government to invoke federal nuisance law to halt the construction
of high-rise towers in Arlington, Virginia. The government alleged that
the completed towers "would be visual intrusions on the monumental
core" 39 of Washington, D.C. Although the injunction was denied,40 the
court acknowledged that the Attorney General of the United States
"has standing to institute and conduct litigation to protect the rights
and properties of the United States."4' 1 This case establishes that, at
least in situations where statutory remedies are nonexistent, a federal
nuisance doctrine may exist.42
If nuisance law has been of-at most-limited use as a device for
protecting federal lands and interests from outside encroachments, some
reasons can be found in the many limitations to the doctrine and obstacles to its implementation. 3 One major obstacle to effective use is that
It is my opinion that Congress did not divest the United States of the
right to sue for injunctive relief in air pollution cases affecting its property.
There is no express language in the [Federal Clean Air] act which divests
the United States of its injunctive remedies....

35

It seems to me that the language of the act suggests that the federal
government does retain its common law rights.
Id. at 1218-19.
" Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 22 (1981) ("[T]he federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is
entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive scope of the FWPCA [Federal Water
Pollution Control Act], which was completely revised after the decision in Illinois v.

Milwaukee.").
37 E.g., United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982) (ruling
that provisions of the Clear Air Act have preempted federal common law).
" 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979).
39

Id. at 143.

The court ruled that the government had failed to prove the existence of a
public nuisance. Id. at 144.
41 Id. at 141. The court noted, "Although the Attorney General concedes that the
United States has no constitutional or statutory right to regulate land use in Rosslyn-he claims the United States, as a Virginia property owner, has the right to question the validity of a nearby zoning that affects its property." Id.
42 See W. RODGERS, supra note 24; Annot., supra note 24.
43 The fact that federal legislation has been held to preempt the common law
where the government files claims against interstate polluters may have operated to
discourage some nuisance actions. Certainly federal legislation has, on its face, curtailed
40
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several defenses are available to alleged tortfeasors in these cases. When
it is the federal government, rather than a private land-owner, that is
seeking to have a neighboring nuisance abated, the neighbor is likely to
raise the objection that such governmental action is inappropriate.
For example, the defendants in County Board argued that the proposed federal regulation was an unwarranted extension of the federal
police power and that to grant an order preventing the erection of the
high-rise towers would constitute a "taking" prohibited by the fifth
amendment. The court agreed: "To sustain such an interference with
the use of private land without compensation as an exercise of the po44
lice power has been farther than the courts have been willing to go."
The equal protection clause furnishes another possible defense: the defendant can claim that the government's action constitutes discriminatory enforcement of federal statutes or regulations. 45 A defense that has
lost much of its persuasiveness in recent years is the argument that the
government's attempted regulation of the nuisance exceeds the powers
conferred under the property clause.46
Despite the availability of these defenses, the longstanding federal
common law of nuisance exists as a potential check against the proliferation of harmful developments outside park borders. Although their
value cannot be objectively proved, such suits and the threat of such
suits in all probability deter those who own property adjacent to the
parks from initiating detrimental activities. At the very least, the potential for such suits may encourage private property owners to discuss
the scope of federal nuisance law; it may be, however, that all the legislation has simply
done is shift the basis for enjoining nuisances from the common law to statutes.
"" 487 F. Supp. at 143. The court pointed to another possible limitation on the
effectiveness of nuisance actions for protecting parks when it asserted that
"[u]nsightliness or offense to the esthetic senses is not sufficient to constitute a public
nuisance." Id. at 143. The Supreme Court, however, has spoken out somewhat differently on this question. In a case discussing standing to challenge the Secretary of the
Interior's alleged failure to prevent interference with a national park, the Court said
that "[a]esthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important
ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less
deserving of legal protection through the judicial process." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405

U.S. 727, 734 (1972). See also Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1075 (1970) (arguing for acceptance and expansion of the
cause of action).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 672, 678 (D.N.J.

1973) vacated on other grounds and remanded with instructions to modify the injunction, 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
46 For a discussion of the claim that government is exceeding its power under the

property clause, see Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing
Doctrine, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 817 (1980). But see Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S.
529 (1976) (interpreting Congress's power under the property clause broadly). See generally infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
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their planned activities with government officials, and discussions may
lead to a mutually satisfactory solution.47 The limited usefulness of the
nuisance doctrine in preserving the national parks may therefore be
more the result of failure to assert it than of any inherent shortcomings
in the doctrine.
B.

The Public Trust Doctrine

This section briefly reviews the extent to which courts have recognized duties imposed upon the federal government and its agencies as
trustees of the national parks. Whereas courts have been quite willing
to recognize the federal government as a trustee of the public lands,
they have been less willing to rule that this trusteeship imposes affirmative duties on federal officials. This judicial reticence has limited the
effectiveness of the public trust doctrine as a tool for combating external
threats to the national parks.
The public trust doctrine holds that the federal government maintains the public lands in trust for the people of the United States and
that congressional authority to protect or dispose of these lands is judicially unreviewable.' 8 Courts have indicated that they accept the doctrine. For example, in an 1897 case, Camfield v. United States, 49 a
landowner had erected a system of fences on private lands, effectively
enclosing over twenty thousand acres of federal public lands. In upholding a congressional act prohibiting such enclosures of federal land,
the Supreme Court stated that the federal government "would be recreant to its duties as trustee for the people of the United States to permit
any individual or private corporation to monopolize [public lands] for
private gain . .

,,50 This notion of a public trusteeship was adverted

47 For example, in Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,
Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973), the private developers went to the National
Park Service with a proposal for the placement of the observation tower. The Park
Service indicated that the site initially proposed was problematic and later approved the
site where the tower was actually constructed. 454 Pa. at 195, 311 A.2d at 589.
48 Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911). As Justice Reed said in
Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954),
The United States holds resources and territory in trust for its citizens in one sense, but not in the sense that a private trustee holds for a
cestui que trust. The responsibility of Congress is to utilize the assets that
come into its hands as sovereign in the way that it decides is best for the
future of the Nation . . . .Such congressional determination as the legislation here in question is not subject to judicial review.

Id. at 277 (Reed, J., concurring).
49 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
80

Id. at 524.
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to more recently in United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc.5 1 In
that case, the government sued a mining company that was restricting
access to a national forest adjacent to the public lands the company had
been licensed to mine. In granting the government's request for a court
order barring such restrictions, the court noted that "historically the
United States has managed the lands within the public domain as fee
52
owner and trustee for the people of the United States."1
During the 1970's, the public trust doctrine received a great deal
of attention from commentators, who argued that the doctrine imposed
affirmative duties on government officials. Beginning with Professor
Sax in 1970,58 a number of commentators insisted that the public trust
concept ought to be a means for concerned individuals to challenge in
court the way in which federal agencies and officials manage the public
lands. In 1974, a federal court accepted those arguments.
In that case, Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior,5 5 the
plaintiff environmentalist group alleged that the Secretary of the Interior was failing to protect the Redwood National Park in California
and thus breaching his duties as public trustee of the park. The threats
to the park's well-being came from private lumber companies, which
retained ownership of much of the land surrounding the park. " Extensive lumbering activities conducted on the companies' lands were creating significant problems of improper water drainage and soil erosion
within the park. 57 The court denied the Secretary's motion to dismiss
the case, and ruled that the National Park Service Organic Act 58 and
the Redwood National Park Act "9 impose affirmative duties upon the
51 611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1980).

Id. at 1283.
1 Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine In Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial

:2

Intervention, 68 MiCH. L. Rlv. 471 (1970).

" See, e.g., Cohen, The Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Environment, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 388; Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-TowardLegal
Rights For Natural Objects, 45 S.CAL. L. REv. 450 (1972); Wilkinson, The Public
Trust Doctrinein Public Land Law, 14 U.C.D. L. Rv.269 (1980); Note, Proprietary
Duties of the Federal Government Under the Public Land Trust, 75 MICH. L. Rv.
586 (1977). Without using the term "public trust," Justice Douglas indicated agreement with the public trust approach to environmental protection. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-52 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
5 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
Before Sierra Club brought suit, the Department of the Interior had attempted
to remedy the situation by preparing a report on the "threatened and actual damage"
to the park and by requesting voluntary cooperation from the adjacent companies. Id.
at 92.
57 Id. at 92-93.
5' In construing the Act, the court relied on 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
59 In construing the Act, the court relied on 16 U.S.C. §§ 79b(a), 79c(d), 79c(e)
(1970).
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Secretary to act as trustee of the nation's parks. In its subsequent decision on the merits, the court concluded that "the defendants unreasonably, arbitrarily and in abuse of discretion, have failed, refused and neglected to take steps to exercise and perform duties imposed upon
them" by those statutes. 60
Within a few years of the Redwood Park litigation, however, a
different federal court concluded, in Sierra Club v. Andrus6 1 that the
National Park Service Organic Acte ' did not impose any special "trustee" duties upon the Secretary of the Interior. Relying on the Redwood
Park case, the Sierra Club contested the Secretary's decision not to interfere with the construction in northern Arizona and southern Utah of
energy projects that would disrupt waters flowing through Grand Canyon National Park and other public lands. The court ruled in favor of
the Secretary, holding that his decision not to assert federal water rights
in the area had a "rational basis.""3 In rebutting the plaintiff's claim
that the National Park Service Organic Act imposed special trustee duties upon the Secretary, the court stated: "To the extent that plaintiff's
argument advances the proposition that defendants are charged with
'trust' duties distinguishable from their statutory duties, the Court disagrees. Rather, the Court views the statutory duties previously discussed as comprising all the responsibilities which defendants must
60 Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 293 (N.D. Cal.
1975). Pursuant to the court's decision, the Secretary took the following steps: he petitioned the Office of Management and Budget for money to acquire more buffer-zone
protection; he requested legislative authority to regulate outside the park boundaries; he
asked the private companies to comply with guidelines; he asked California to take
regulatory measures; and he requested the Justice Department to sue the timber companies. The district court held that by taking these steps, the Department of the Interior had "in good faith and to the best of its ability" complied with the court's earlier
order. Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172, 175 (N.D. Cal.
1976).
61 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980). The Sierra Club took a narrow appeal from
the district court's judgment, challenging only the court's decision not to rule upon
whether the Lands Policy Act confers by implication certain federal reserved water
rights. The court of appeals upheld the district court. Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d
203, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
62 Subsequent to the Redwood Park litigation, the relevant section of the National
Park Service Organic Act was amended, with the following language added:
The authorization of activities shall be construed and the protection, management, and administration of these areas shall be conducted in light of
the high public value and integrity of the National Park System and shall
not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for which these
various areas have been established.
Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-250, § 101(b), 92 Stat. 163, 166 (1980) (codified
at 16 U.S.C. § la-1 (1982)).
13 487 F. Supp. at 450.
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faithfully discharge.""
As the Redwood Park and Andrus cases indicate, the chief disadvantage of the public trust doctrine is that its application, depends upon
judicial interpretation of vague statutory language.65 Because of statutory imprecision, courts are free to find or not to find affirmative trustee duties as they see fit. Since primary responsibility for maintaining
public lands rests with Congress,66 the simplest way to strengthen the
pu6lic trust doctrine would be for Congress explicitly to impose trustee
duties upon the Secretary in park enabling statutes.
Such a solution may not be politically feasible, however. Many of
the western states, in which federal lands constitute a significant percentage of the total acreage, fear that imposing specific preservationist
duties upon the Secretary will prevent economic development in their
states.67 Indeed, one commentator has argued that the federal government no longer has any trustee authority over public lands in the western states: "There can be little doubt that a trust was in fact created at
the time of the original cessions of western lands under the Confederation. However, the states placed the lands in trust only until the area
could be formed into new and independent states." 8
Despite the obstacles to developing the public trust doctrine into a
viable tool for preserving national parks, commentators continue to assert that the doctrine can play an effective role.6 9 Even if Congress fails
to make the trustee duties explicit, courts remain free to infer such duties from existing statutes. A recent commentator has stated that "the
" Id. at 449. The court based its decision on a review of the legislative history of
the 1978 amendments to the National Park Service Organic Act. See supra note 62 and
accompanying text. For a critique of this decision, see Wilkinson, supra note 54, at
290-93. For a brief discussion of the Redwood Park and Andrus cases, see Tarlock,
supra note 16, at 268-69.
69 Another problem with the doctrine is uncertainty about exactly what duties
public trusteeship entails. In Andrus, the court refused to find any special trustee duties, holding that the Secretary's decision whether to assert federal water rights need
only have a "rational basis." 487 F. Supp. at 450. See also supra text accompanying
note 63. If the Andrus court had interpreted the statute to include special trustee duties, it is not at all clear what those duties would have been.
66 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see also supra note 48 and accompanying
text.
67 In recent congressional debates over a bill that would increase the Secretary's
responsibilities to preserve parks, many representatives from western states argued that
the bill would operate to the detriment of economic growth in their states. See infra
notes 125-26 and text accompanying notes 125-29.
68 Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: ConstitutionalIssues Surrounding
Federal Ownership of the Public Lands, 12 PAc. L.J. 693, 704 (1981) (footnote
omitted).
69 See, e.g., The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law and Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 181 (1980) (papers by Professor Sax, Professor Wilkinson, Deputy Attorney General Stevens, and others).
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fact that the public trust doctrine in public land law must rest on implication should surprise no one. The doctrine has always rested on implication."7 ° This implication, he argues, is supported by recent legislation
that reflects a national interest in preserving and prudently managing
our public resources. Perhaps continuing encroachments on our national parks will impel courts to accept and impose this implied public
trust.
II.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES AND POTENTIALS

Since solving the problems posed by threats external to national
parks through reliance on the nuisance and public trust doctrines has
proved only partially successful, it is important to examine existing and
potential legislative responses to the parks' problems. This part first
discusses the limited usefulness of federal statutes enacted to combat
threats to specific national wildlife and parks. A pending bill, H.R.
2379, which is designed to identify and eliminate threats to the national
parks, is then discussed and critiqued.
A.

Existing Legislative Responses

In 1916, Congress enacted legislation establishing the National
Park Service.7 1 That statute provides that the purpose of the Park Service is "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and
the wild life therein" and to "leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment
of future generations. '7 2 In 1978, Congress supplemented this section
concerning the purposes of the Park Service and insisted that
[t]he authorization of activities shall be construed and the
protection, management, and administration of these areas
shall be conducted in light of the high public value and integrity of the National Park System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for which
these various areas have been established.7
Although somewhat rhetorical, this statement manifests Congress's intent that preservation of the national parks be a primary concern of the
Park Service. Thus, when developments bordering on the parks
threaten them, the Park Service is responsible for taking measures to
ensure that the developments do not intrude upon the parks. Despite
supra note 54, at 299.
§ 1, 39 Stat. 535 (1916) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-20g (1982)).
72 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
73 Id. § la-1.
70 Wilkinson,
71
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this congressional mandate, park officials have never attempted to regulate developments on park borderlands solely on the basis of these statutory passages.
Federal officials have, however, taken measures to affect such private behavior on nonfederal lands pursuant to authority vested in them
by other federal legislation. Federal interference with the activities of
private parties most commonly occurs where Congress authorizes acquisition of adjoining private lands, the proposed development of which
"could significantly damage the park resources or is incompatible with
park values." 7 4 Since many of the park enabling statutes include sections setting forth explicit guidelines for acquiring private lands, 5 land
acquisition has proven an important means for protecting parks from
their neighbors. 7' As suggested previously, however, park preservation
through land acquisition is unsatisfactory in the long run7 7 for reasons
such as cost.7 8 Two other legislatively authorized measures for protect-

ing federal interests from adverse private activities deserve special
attention.7 9
7" NATIONAL PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MANAGEMENT POLIcEs IX-1 (1978), quoted in Lambert, supra note 11, at 36.
7' The enabling statutes of parks created after 1959 generally contain detailed

procedures and express grants of authority for additional land acquisitions. See Lambert, supra note 11, at 36-37. The National Park Service has developed its own programs and procedures for acquiring lands in and around parks created before 1959. Id.
71 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
77 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
7' Between 1965 and 1977, the National Park Service spent $815 million to
purchase nearly one million acres of land from over 45,000 property owners. UNITED
STATES

GEN.

ACCOUNTING

OFF.,

THE

FEDERAL

DRIVE

TO

ACQUIRE

PRIVATE

(1979), cited in Lambert, supra note 11, at 36 n.8.
7' Two less recent examples of such measures should be mentioned. In Camfield
v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute that prohibited the enclosure of public lands by private individuals. The
defendants had enclosed over 20,000 acres of federal lands through the erection of an
"ingenious" scheme of fences on their own property. Id. at 525. In upholding a lower
court's order that the defendants remove the fences, the Court stated,
Considering the obvious purposes of this structure, and the necessities of
preventing the enclosure of public lands, we think the fence is clearly a
nuisance, and that it is within the constitutional power of Congress to
order its abatement, notwithstanding such action may involve an entry
upon the lands of a private individual.
Id. The Court noted that had the fences been erected directly on the federal property
the government could have removed them without relying upon the statute but that the
statute was important in the existing situation since the fences were on private lands.
Id. at 524-25.
United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927), involved a federal statute that imposed criminal liability on those who build and fail to extinguish fires near public
lands. Alford asserted that the statute could not constitutionally reach him since his fire
was situated on private land. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, did not agree:
"The danger depends upon the nearness of the fire, not upon the ownership of the land
LANDS SHOULD BE REASSESSED 9
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The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act"0 was passed by
Congress in 1971 to protect "all unbranded and unclaimed horses and
burros on public lands of the United States"8 " from "capture, branding,
harassment, or death." 2 The Act authorizes the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture to "enter into cooperative agreements with other
landowners and with the State and local governmental agencies and
. . .issue such regulations as . . .[are] necessary for the furtherance

of the purposes of this chapter."8 3 In Kleppe v. New Mexico, 4 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in a unanimous
decision that has far-reaching implications for the authority of Congress to protect public lands and interests from the activities of neighboring private property owners.
The controversy in Kleppe arose after a local rancher requested
that the New Mexico Livestock Board remove a number of burros that
were interfering with his cattle.8 5 After the burros were captured and
auctioned off, the Secretary of the Interior sought to have the Livestock
Board recover and return the burros. In response, New Mexico
brought suit for a declaration that the Act was unconstitutional.
In a sweeping opinion, the Court held that when acting pursuant
to the property clause of the Constitution, 6 "the power over the public
land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations. 8a7 Further, the
Court held that federal legislation regarding the public lands will prevail over conflicting state law.8 8 The opinion, not surprisingly, has
where it is built.... Congress may prohibit the doing of acts upon privately owned
lands that imperil the publicly owned forests." Id. at 267.
80 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982).
81 Id. § 1332(b).
82 Id. § 1331.
83 Id. § 1336.
84 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
'5 The Bureau of Land Management had previously denied the rancher's request
to remove the burros. The land itself was federal and was being leased to the rancher
for grazing purposes. 426 U.S. at 533.
88 The property clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2, states that "Congress shall
have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States ....
87 426 U.S. at 539 (quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29
(1940)).
88 But while Congress can acquire exclusive or partial jurisdiction over
lands within a State by the State's consent or cession, the presence or absence of such jurisdiction has nothing to do with Congress' powers under
the Property Clause. Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains
jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally
surely retains the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. . . . "A different rule would place the public
domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation."
426 U.S. at 534 (quoting Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897)) (other
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sparked a good deal of debate over its expansive interpretation of the
property clause and the implications thereof.8 9 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court clearly interprets the Constitution as granting Congress
wide power to care for the public lands.9"
A similar example of congressional action regulating the use of
private lands in order to protect federal interests is the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act9 (BWCAWA) of 1978. In Minnesota
ex rel. Alexander v. Block,9 2 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the portions of the Act limiting the use of motorized vehicles in the wilderness area. 3 The United States owned ninety percent
of the land within the designated wilderness area, and the state of Minnesota owned most of the remaining ten percent.9 4 In upholding Congress's authority to limit motorized vehicles throughout the entire wilderness area, the court of appeals, relying heavily on Kleppe,9 5 stated,
Under the authority conferred by the property clause to
protect the public land, Congress' power must extend to regulation of conduct on or off the public land that would
threaten the designated purpose of federal lands. Congress
clearly has the power to dedicate federal land for particular
citations omitted). See also supra note 79. One of the arguments raised by New Mexico
in Kleppe was that the Livestock Board's action of rounding up and auctioning off the
burros was valid since the Board acted pursuant to the New Mexico Estray Law,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-14-1 (1966) (codified as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7713-1 to 77-13-10 (1978)). See 426 U.S. at 533, 541-46.
9 See, e.g., Engdahl, State And Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARiz.
L. REV. 283, 348-58, 369-71 (1976); Gaetke, Congressional Discretion Under the
Property Clause, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 381 (1981); Note, supra note 46.
90 The opinion did not accord Congress limitless power. The Court said that "the
furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved." 426 U.S. at 539. Consequently, the Court decided to "leave open the
question of the permissible reach of the Act over private lands under the Property
Clause." Id. at 547.
9' Pub. L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649-59 (1978). The Boundary Waters Canoe
Area Wilderness appears in the tabular listing of official wilderness areas at 16 U.S.C.

§ 1132 (1982).
92 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
"' See id. at 1246-47 n.9 (upholding BWCAWA § 4(c), (e), (f), (i),92 Stat. 1649,
1650-52). Section 4(i) of the law states in part: "Except for motorboats, snowmobiles,
and mechanized portaging, as authorized and defined herein, no other motorized use of
the wilderness shall be permitted." BWCAWA § 4(i), 92 Stat. at 1652.
94 660 F.2d at 1244.
91 The Block court, for example, quoted Kleppe's statement that "the furthest
reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively
resolved" but that "'the power over the public lands thus entrusted to Congress is
without limitations,'" Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539, quoted in Block, 660 F.2d at 1248. The
Block court then concluded that "with this guidance, we must decide the question left
open in Kleppe-the scope of Congress's property clause power as applied to activity
occurring off federal land." Block, 660 F.2d at 1248.
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purposes. As a necessary incident of that power, Congress
must have the ability to ensure that these lands be protected
against interference with their intended purposes. 6
Further, the court rejected the appellants' argument that the tenth
amendment to the Constitution9 barred the application of Congress's
motorized vehicle restrictions to land and waters under state jurisdiction."' As in Kleppe, the court's position here is quite dear: Congress
has broad authority under the property clause to protect public lands
from private activities.9"
Although these examples indicate that the federal government has
the constitutional authority to protect its interests and lands through
provisions in specific legislation, this is not to say that the method is a
desirable one for the more general problem of protecting national parks
from outside encroachments. As the BWCAWA example indicates, to
be effective, such an approach might require a great deal of specificity.
Section 4(c) of that act, for example, is devoted to a detailed listing of
various lakes and waterways and the horsepower limitations on motorboats using those lakes.1 00 With all its specificity, BWCAWA alone is
insufficient to address or anticipate all the problems that face that wilderness area.10 1
To require that Congress first identify and then rectify through
96 660 F.2d at 1249 (footnote omitted).
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONsT. amend. X.
9' The court used the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), as the one properly
to be applied in tenth amendment challenges brought under the rationale of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The court held that appellants' argument failed under the first part of the Virginia Surface Mining test: § 4 of the BWCAWA does not regulate the "States as States." Block, 660 F.2d at 1251-52.
In another group of appeals considered in the same opinion, the Block court rejected challenges to § 5 of the BWCAWA, which gives the United States a right of first
refusal with respect to certain property in the area. 92 Stat. at 1652. The court held
that § 5 did not amount to an unconstitutional taking by the government, and that it
did not deprive private citizens of their property rights without due process of law. 660
F.2d at 1255-56.
" See also United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979) (ruling that the
Secretary of Agriculture can regulate against camping and campfires on state lands
surrounded by National Forests: "It is well established that this [property] clause
grants to the United States power to regulate conduct on non-federal land when reasonably necessary to protect adjacent federal property or navigable waters").
100 BWCAWA § 4(c), 92 Stat. at 1650-51.
101 That Congress was aware that the Act could not handle all possible situations
is evident by § 15 of the Act: "The Secretary [of Agriculture] is authorized to promulgate and enforce regulations that limit or prohibit the use of motorized equipment on or
relating to waters located within the wilderness in accordance with the provisions of
this Act." Id. § 15, 92 Stat. at 1657.

1206

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:1189

specific, extensive legislation all the threats facing each national park
area would be to impose an exhausting if not impossible chore. Clearly,
a more efficient and comprehensive approach is needed for dealing with
the threats facing our national parks.
B. H.R. 2379: A Systematic But Insufficient Approach
That Congress has begun to recognize the need for a systematic,
comprehensive approach to the serious problems confronting the national parks is demonstrated by the recent passage of H.R. 237902 by
the House of Representatives.'" The purpose of the bill, entitled the
"National Park System Protection and Resources Management Act of
1983, ' 04 is "to provide for a high degree of protection and preservation
of the natural and cultural resources within the national park system."' 0 5 Despite this laudable goal, H.R. 2379 fails to provide a viable
mechanism for ensuring lasting protection of the national parks from
external threats.
H.R. 2379 was developed in response to a 1980 National Park
Service survey that detailed over four thousand individual threats to the
various parks.1 "' The Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, to
which the bill was referred upon introduction,10 7 concluded that more
102 H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The bill was amended several times
on the floor of the House before it was passed. The bill, as passed by the House, can be
found at 129 CONG. REC. H7914-17 (amendment in the nature of a substitute offered
by Rep. Udall), H7917-18 (amendment offered by Rep. Seiberling to the amendment
in the nature of a substitute offered by Rep. Udall), H7931 (amendment offered by
Rep. Murphy to the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Rep. Udall, as
amended), H7932 (amendment offered by Rep. Brown of Colorado to the amendment
in the nature of a substitute offered by Rep. Udall, as amended), and H7933 (amendment offered by Rep. Seiberling to the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered
by Rep. Udall, as amended) (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983).
102 The bill passed the House on October 4, 1983. 129 CONG. REc. H7934 (daily
ed. Oct. 4, 1983). The bill was then referred to the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources, which has yet to report the bill to the full Senate. Id. at S13,767
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1983).
During the second session of the 97th Congress, H.R. 5162, which was virtually
identical to H.R. 2379, passed the House but was never reported to the full Senate for
debate. 128 CONG. REC. at H7914 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1982).
a H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, 129 CONG. REc. H7914 (daily ed. Oct.
4, 1983) (for the bill in its entirety as amended, see supra note 102).
105 Id. § 3, 129 CONG. REC. H7914 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983).
108 129 CONG. REc. H7869 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1983). The survey was completed at
the request of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and was conducted by
asking each park superintendent to detail the nature and source of each threat to the
park.
107 The bill was introduced by Representative John F. Seiberling of Ohio and 85
cosponsors on March 24, 1983. Id. at H1i809 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1983). Representative
Seiberling serves as chairman of the Subcommittee on Public Lands and National
Parks. See id. at H7869 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1983) (statement of Rep. Seiberling).
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than fifty percent of those threats were attributable to sources external
to the parks.108 Those who drafted H.R. 2379 developed four key provisions that may aid in confronting existing and future external threats
to the parks.
First, the bill requires the Secretary of the Interior to submit a
"state of the parks" report to Congress every two years.1"' Among
other things, the report must describe "the impact from identified factors and forces, ranked in order of priority, emanating from both inside
and outside the unit, that damage or threaten to damage" each of the
national parks.1 The report must also assess the existing and potential
legal authority for dealing with these threats.1 1
Second, in a report submitted annually to Congress, the Secretary
must "identify and establish priorities among at least the fifty most critical" natural and cultural resource problems within the park system."
This list "should constitute the systemwide priority problems emanating from outside, as well as inside the parks. ' .. 3
Third, in the case of areas "adjacent to any unit of the national
park system" 11' 4 where the Secretary has existing authority to issue a
lease, grant a permit, or dispose of federal resources, the Secretary must
determine if exercising that authority will have a "significant adverse
effect"11 5 on the "values for which the national park system was established."1 "" The Secretary must decline to exercise that authority if the
"public interest in preventing such adverse effect on such values signifiH.R. REP. No. 170, supra note 4, at 3; see also 129 CONG. REC. H7869
(daily ed. Oct. 3, 1983) (statement of Rep. Seiberling).
109 H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 129 CONG. REC. H7914 (daily ed. Oct.
4, 1983) (for the bill in its entirety as amended, see supra note 102).
110 Id. § 4(a)(1)(B), 129 CONG. REC. H7914 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983).
1l

"I Id. § 4(a)(3)(F), 129 CONG. REC. H7914 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983).
Id. § 5, 129 CONG. REC. H7915 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983) (emphasis omitted).

112

H.R. REP. No. 170, supra note 4, at 5.
Much debate in committee focused on defining "adjacent to." One amendment
that was adopted but subsequently dropped by the committee defined the term as
nearby and not in excess of ten miles from the park boundary. See H.R. REP. No. 170,
supra note 4, at 11. The issue of defining "adjacent to" was also raised several times
during the House debate. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REC. H7871 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1983)
(statement of Rep. Lujan); id. at H7873 (statement of Rep. Hansen); id. at H7875
(statement of Rep. Nielson).
21 H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b), 129 CONG. REC. H7917 (daily ed.
Oct. 4, 1983). Some members of Congress were troubled that the term "significant
adverse effect" was not defined in the bill. As one representative asked, "Does a little
dust being raised by a car, or by a horse, a cow or whatever, in the vicinity, is that a
significant action before going to lease that land for grazing?" 129 CONG. REC. H7873
(daily ed. Oct. 3, 1983) (statement of Rep. Lujan).
116H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b), 129 CONG. Rac. H7917 (daily ed.
Oct. 4, 1983) (for the bill in its entirety as amended, see supra note 102).
113

114
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cantly outweighs the public interest value of the proposed action." '
Finally, in what has been described as the "most objectionable
part" of the bill, 1 " H.R. 2379 requires all federal agencies contemplating action within or adjacent to a national park to inform the Secretary
of such proposed action whenever there is a possibility of a "significant
adverse effect" on the park."1 9 The Secretary must respond to the
agency within sixty days with comments and recommendations for
changes in the proposed action, if necessary.12 0
Although H.R. 2379 passed the House by a margin of almost
four-to-one, 21 the bill met with stiff opposition from several sources on
various grounds. Several members of Congress, for example, doubted
the reliability of the 1980 National Park Service survey that prompted
the bill. 122 Both the National Park Service1 23 and the Department of
the Interior12 4 contended that the bill was unnecessary and imposed
...Id. The Secretary is also required to publish the record of his decision in the
Federal Register and transmit copies of the "decision documents" to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the House Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs. Id.
118 H.R. REP. No. 170, supra note 4, at 20 (dissenting views). During the House
debate, one representative, who had been among the three members of the Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs who dissented to the committee's report on H.R. 2379,
stated, "[S]ection 11 I think is one of the most devastating things I have seen come
along for a long time." 129 CONG. REc. H7873 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1983) (statement of
Rep. Hansen).
119 H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11, 129 CONG. REc. H7917-18 (daily ed.
Oct. 4, 1983) (for the bill in its entirety as amended, see supra note 102).
110 Id. § 11(c), 129 CONG. REc. H7917-18 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983). If the proposed action will occur "within" one of the parks, the sister agency cannot proceed
until the Secretary approves the action. If the proposed action will occur "adjacent to"
national park land, the sister agency is free to ignore the Secretary's recommendations.
See id. § 11(e), 129 CONG. REc. H7918 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983).
121 The recorded vote was 321 "yeas" and 82 "nays," with 30 not voting. 129
CONG. REC. H7934 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983). Interestingly, H.R. 5162, the predecessor
to H.R. 2379, was introduced during the second session of the 97th Congress and
passed the House by a recorded vote of 319 "yeas" to 84 "nays." 128 id. at H7914
(daily ed. Sept. 29, 1982).
122 The dissenting members of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
called the survey a "woefully inadequate and hastily-prepared document." H.R. REP.
No. 170, supra note 4, at 17. See also 129 CONG. REC. H7872 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1983)
(statement of Rep. Hansen). Even Representative Seiberling, who introduced the bill,
referred to the survey as "somewhat of a subjective study." Id. at H7869.
2' Mr. Russell Dickenson, Director of the National Park Service, testified during
the subcommittee hearings on H.R. 2379, and part of his testimony was quoted during
the House debate of the bill. Mr. Dickenson stated that the duties to be imposed on the
Park Service and Secretary of the Interior by the bill were already part of their responsibilities, and that "essentially" he objected to H.R. 2379 because it made those responsibilities a statutory requirement. 129 CONG. REC. H7870 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1983)
(statement of Rep. Seiberling).
124 "H.R. 2379 is unnecessary, duplicates existing laws and administrative programs, creates more red tape, and imposes inflexible requirements on resource management efforts that should remain flexible enough to apply available staff and funds to

19841

PROTECTING NATIONAL PARKS

statutory duties in an area better handled through administrative
discretion.
The most frequent criticism of the bill, however, was that it permitted federal interference with state and local interests. Representatives from the western states, where federal landholdings account for
more than thirty percent of the land in ten states, 125 feared that the bill
would hinder economic growth by putting national park interests ahead
of all others.12 For instance, a representative from Utah, noted that, if
"adjacent to" were defined to mean within a ten-mile radius of the
park, as some had suggested, 27 the effect would be to "tie up, basically,
all of southern and eastern Utah."1'28 The dissenting members of the
House committee ihat reviewed the bill concluded:
[L]ocal and state governments, who through no fault of their
own are located adjacent to national parks, should not be
asked to sacrifice their growth and the economic well-being
of their citizens because of perceived threats against park resources which emanate from beyond the borders of their
neighboring parks without an adequate opportunity for input into the identification of, and amelioration of, any such
perceived problems. 29
It was probably this fear of excessive federal interference with local interests that caused the drafters of H.R. 2379 to create a toothless
bill. In many respects, the responsibilities imposed upon the Secretary
of the Interior by the bill are information-gathering duties: the Secretary must biennially catalogue and report to Congress the major interchanging needs. It attempts to impose statutory mandates on what are properly discretionary administrative functions." H.R. REP. No. 170, supra note 4, at 12-13 (letter of
Apr. 26, 1983, from Acting Assistant Secretary of the Interior J. Craig Potter to Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Chairman Morris K. Udall).
125 See tables in Note, supra note 46, at 817 n.1.
126 As summarized by one of the representatives from Oregon:
H.R. 2379 threatens community development, improvement projects, sewage treatment plants, road construction, and airports. This bill as currently drafted will also hinder mineral exploration, timber harvest, grazing, recreation, and other multiple uses in areas adjacent to national parks.
These delays will certainly have a negative impact on jobs and the economies in communities adjacent to national parks.
129 CONG. REC. H7876 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1983) (statement of Rep. Smith).
17 See supra note 114 and text accompanying notes 114-17.
128 129 CONG. REC. H7875 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1983) (statement of Rep. Nielson).
Il H.R. REP. No. 170, supra note 4, at 17-18. The dissenting members stated
further, "Only by rolling the stone back over the crypt of Washington interference will
local leaders and affected communities be afforded the autonomy they deserve." Id. at
20.
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nal and external threats facing the parks,13 0 and he or she must annually prioritize the fifty most critical such threats. 131 Although the
Secretary is required to assess the existing legal authority for handling
these threats, 3 2 he or she is given no new substantive authority for
combating these threats. The House committee that reviewed and endorsed the bill stressed that
[allthough the point was discussed fully during the committee markup of the bill, it bears further clarification that

the provisions of this bill do not provide either the Secretary
or the National Park Service with any new authority to block

or prohibit any project, action or initiativeproposed by local,
state, or Federal governmental units outside of park
1 33

boundaries.

With respect to private action on public lands adjacent to the national parks, the Secretary is permitted to deny the issuance of a lease
or the grant of a permit where the proposed action may adversely affect
the park. 3 This authority, however, the Secretary already has.135 Regarding proposed action by other federal agencies, the "bill merely establishes a review and coordination mechanism to assure that all aspects of any Federal action's impacts on national park resources are
fully considered. '1 36 If the Secretary disapproves of the proposed action
on land adjacent to the park, the sister agency is free to ignore the
130 H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 129 CONG. REC. H7914 (daily ed. Oct.
4, 1983) (for the bill in its entirety as amended, see supra note 102); see also supra
notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
131 H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5, 129 CONG. REc. H7915 (daily ed. Oct.
4, 1983) (for the bill in its entirety as amended, see supra note 102); see also supra
notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
132 H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(3)(F), 129 CONG. REc. H7914 (daily
ed. Oct. 4, 1983) (for the bill in its entirety as amended, see supra note 102); see also
supra note 111 and accompanying text.
"I H.R. REP. No. 170, supra note 4, at 10 (emphasis added). The representative
who introduced the bill reiterated this observation during the House debate: "Truly,
this is a modest bill. . . . It does not give the Secretary of the Interior, or anyone else,
a veto over any Federal, State, local or private action-and I repeat that, it does not
give anyone a veto over any Federal, State, or local or private action." 129 CONG. REC.
H7870 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1983) (statement of Rep. Seiberling).
134 H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b), 129 CONG. REc. H7917 (daily ed.
Oct. 4, 1983) (for the bill in its entirety as amended, see supra note 102); see also
supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
135 The language of the bill makes it clear that the provisions only apply where
the Secretary already has power to act: "where the Secretary of the Interior is vested
with any authority." H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(a), (b), 129 CONG. REC.
H7917 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983) (emphasis added) (for the bill in its entirety as
amended, see supra note 102).
138 H.R. REP. No. 170, supra note 4, at 10.

19841

PROTECTING NATIONAL PARKS

Secretary's recommendation."'

7

Thus, despite its laudatory objectives, H.R. 2379 falls far short of
ensuring preservation of park resources. This bill provides for increased
congressional awareness of threats to the parks without furnishing
those in charge of the parks with any substantive authority for combating the threats. Not only does it fail to vest the Secretary with the requisite additional authority, but it also fails to establish a duty to address
the threats with existing authority. For example, the bill ignores the
whole realm of private nuisances on lands adjoining the parks, where
such nuisances do not involve the issuance of a lease or the granting of
a permit to use the park lands.
Clearly, more effective legislation is needed.
III. A PROPOSAL
Praiseworthy objectives and numerous salutary provisions notwithstanding, H.R. 2379 is largely an ineffective response to the growing dangers posed by developments on lands adjacent to the national
parks. A more effective response is legislation that retains the positive
features of H.R. 2379 and then imposes upon the Secretary of the Interior a well-defined affirmative duty and the substantive authority to
confront threats to the national parks from beyond their borders.
A. Retaining Portions of H.R. 2379
Probably the most salient feature of H.R. 2379 is that it provides
a mechanism for communicating within the federal government the recognition of external threats to each of the national parks. The provisions establishing this mechanism should be retained and, in some circumstances, expanded.
For example, H.R. 2379 requires that the Secretary provide Congress with a biennial "state of the parks" report that details the various
threats to each of the national parks and sets forth the past and proposed future action to counter those threats.1 3 ' This requirement of accountability to Congress should be retained. Included within this proviH.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11(e), 129 CONG. REc. H7918 (daily ed.
Oct. 4, 1983) (for the bill in its entirety as amended, see supra note 102). This section
states that the Secretary's approval is required only when the proposed agency action
will affect "[qederally owned lands or waters which are administered by the Secretary
of the Interior and which are located within the authorized boundary of a National
Park System unit." See supra note 120 and text accompanying notes 118-20.
13" H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 129 CONG. R c. H7914 (daily ed. Oct.
137

4, 1983) (for the bill in its entirety as amended, see supra note 102); see also supra
notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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sion should be a requirement that the superintendents of each park
regularly inform the Secretary of potential dangers to the park.
Similarly, H.R. 2379 requires the Secretary to submit to Congress
an annual report that prioritizes the "fifty most critical" threats to the
parks' natural and cultural resources.1 39 This provision should be
amended to permit Congress to modify the Secretary's list of priorities.
Permitting congressional modification provides the accountability mechanism necessary for ensuring that the Secretary's priorities do not reflect a strong pro-industry bias and that they accurately represent the
true needs of the park system.1 40 Bias and inaccuracy have been a problem; House debates on H.R. 2379, for example, indicate that the bill
was prompted, at least in part, by what many regarded as deliberate
failure on the part of the incumbent Secretary of the Interior to protect
1 41
the national parks.
Finally, H.R. 2379 requires federal agencies to notify the Secretary when they contemplate any action on land adjacent to a national
park that may adversely affect that park. 2 The Secretary is then required to "make such comments and recommendations as he or she
deems appropriate."' 43 Although this provision does not require the
agency to abide by the Secretary's recommendations, 144 the provision at
119 H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5, 129 CONG. REc. H7915 (daily ed. Oct.
4, 1983) (for the bill in its entirety as amended, see supra note 102); see also supra
notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
140 This "critical" list may also serve to define the contours of the standing requirement that is proposed in the following section. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
141 For example, during the House debates, the representative who introduced
H.R. 2379 made the following remarks about then Secretary of the Interior James
Watt when explaining why the bill must "spell out" the Secretary's duties to the national parks:
The gentlemen [Rep. Hansen of Utah] talked about zealous Secretaries of Interior. Certainly none is more zealous that [sic] the present incumbent. What his zeal is directed to is another question.
Certainly it is not directed to protecting the natural and cultural values in the national parks to the same degree as it is directed toward developing certain other types of resources, regardless of the consequences on
the national park or other natural values.
So all I can say is if there ever was a reason for spelling it out we
have that reason today, and that is in the demeanor and actions of the
present Secretary.
129 CONG. RIc. H7921 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983) (statement of Rep. Seiberling).
142 H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11(a), 129 CONG. Rc.H7917 (daily ed.
Oct. 4, 1983) (for the bill in its entirety as amended, see supra note 102); see also
supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
148 H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11(b), 129 CONG. REC.H7917 (daily ed.
Oct. 4, 1983) (for the bill in its entirety as amended, see supra note 102).
144 See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. Requiring the agency to abide
by the Secretary's recommendations would, in effect, give the Secretary veto power over
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least requires both the agency and the Secretary to consider the proposed action's impact upon the park. Also, a copy of the Secretary's
recommendations and the agency's ultimate decision must be submitted
to the "appropriate committees' of Congress," 45 which then have the
power to initiate legislation to counteract a decision that may adversely
affect a national park.
B.

Providing the Secretary with an Affirmative Duty and
Substantive Authority

Most of the provisions of H.R. 2379 that this proposal seeks to
retain merely provide mechanisms for gathering and dispersing information about threats beyond the parks' borders. In order to animate
these provisions, this proposal imposes upon the Secretary of the Interior an affirmative duty and the substantive authority to issue regulations for dealing with these external threats. In issuing regulations, the
Secretary "must demonstrate a nexus between the regulated conduct
and the federal land"1 4 and must establish "that the regulations are
necessary to protect federal proptty.' ' 1 7 Further, the regulations are to
be issued in accordance with the. procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA.). 4 8 Finally, private citizens and environmental groups shall have standing to challenge any alleged failure by
the Secretary to carry out these duties.
As an initial matter, this delegation to the Secretary of the power
to issue regulations that affect activities on private lands is constitutional. Congress's power, pursuant to the property clause, to protect
federal lands extends to activities on private lands, according to the decisions in Kleppe v. New Mexico 49 and Minnesota ex rel. Alexander v.
Block.150 Although this power is not limitless, the court in Block noted
that the exercise of the power would be constitutional if Congress could
"demonstrate a nexus between the regulated conduct and the federal
land, establishing that the regulations are necessary to protect federal
many of the activities of numerous federal agencies.
145 H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11(c), 129 CONG. REc. H7917-18 (daily
ed. Oct. 4, 1983) (for the bill in its entirety as amended, see supra note 102).
146 Minnesota ex rel. Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 n.18 (8th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1992).
147 Id.
148 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982).
149 426 U.S. 529 (1976). "Camfield [v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897)] contains no suggestion of any limitatibon on Coftgress' power over conduct on its own property; its sole message is that the pbWer granted by the Property Clause is broad enough
to reach beyond territorial limits." Id. at 538. See supra notes 80, 86, 88, 90, 95 & 100
and text accompanying notes 80-99.
150 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
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property." ' Thus, since Congress has the power to monitor activities
on private lands that adversely affect the national parks, the delegation
of that power to the Secretary, provided that the Secretary demonstrates
the requisite "nexus," would likewise be constitutional.
This proposal requires that the Secretary's regulations be issued in
accordance with the procedures established in the APA.' 5 2 That act sets
forth specific guidelines to be followed by agencies engaging in either
rulemaking 53 or adjudication,"" and it also prescribes the standard of
judicial review of the agency action.1 55 The decision whether to proceed
by rulemaking or adjudication is generally left to the discretion of the
agency. 5 This Comment, however, suggests that, if the Secretary of
the Interior decides to issue regulations through rulemaking, he or she
should be required to use "notice and comment" procedures. 157 These
procedures mandate publication in the Federal Register of proposed
rules1" 8 and allow interested parties to submit "written data, views, or
59
arguments with or without the opportunity for oral presentation.")
This proposal also grants private citizens and environmental
groups the standing to challenge alleged failures by the Secretary to
perform the duties imposed by this proposal. The standing provision
should be similar to that contained in the Clean Water Act,'
which
660 F.2d at 1249 n.18 (citing Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897)).
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982).
"Rule making" is defined as the "agency process for formulating, amending,
or repealing a rule." Id. § 551(5). A "rule" is defined in part as "the whole or part of
an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency." Id. § 551(4).
'" "Adjudication" is defined as the "agency process for the formulation of an
order." Id. § 551(7). An "order" is defined as "the whole or part of a final disposition,
whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a
matter other than rule making but including licensing." Id. § 551(6).
155In general, agency action that involves either on-the-record rulemaking or adjudication will be enforced by a reviewing court unless the agency action is unsupported
by substantial evidence. Id. § 706(2)(E). All other forms of agency action will be enforced unless the agency action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. § 706(2)(A). See Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-15 (1971).
156 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
Id. § 553(b).
's
Id. § 553(c). The statute specifically exempts matters relating to "public property" from the standard notice and comment procedures. Id. § 553(a)(2). This exemption has been sharply criticized, however, and this Comment therefore suggests a statutory requirement that the Secretary's rulemaking power be exercised in accordance
with the notice and comment procedures. See Bonfield, PublicParticipationin Federal
152
'
lBS

Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118
U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1970).
180 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981).
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permits private citizens to file suit when there is an alleged failure by
'
the administrator to perform an act "which is not discretionary."161
Such a standing provision is essential to ensure that the Secretary fulfills his or her affirmative duty to confront harmful developments beyond the borders of our national parks; as noted above, one of the motivating factors behind the drafting of H.R. 2379 was a perceived failure
by the Secretary to preserve and protect national park land." 2
Providing the Secretary with an affirmative duty and the substantive authority to issue regulations to protect our national parks from
external threats vests the Secretary with far more responsibility and
power than currently held. 6 ' This newly created authority, however, is
neither limitless nor free from scrutiny by the other branches of the
government. For example, if the Secretary issues a regulation pursuant
to this proposal that is adverse to a developer hoping to build on land
adjacent to a national park, that developer can challenge the Secretary's
action in court on two grounds.
First, the developer can allege that insufficient nexus exists between the proposed development and the park and that the Secretary
therefore exceeded his or her powers under the statute.16 4 Second, in
accordance with the APA, the Secretary's decisionmaking process is
subject to judicial review. 165 As noted by Judge Leventhal, the effect of
this review is to ensure fairness in the administrative process. 6 In addition to judicial review, Congress at all times remains free to supplement the Secretary's action by enacting legislation addressing the needs
of a particular park, such as the BWCAWA at issue in Block.""7
161 Id. § 1365(a)(2).

See supra note 141 and accompanying text. A statutory determination, however, must be made about which of the Secretary's acts are to be deemed "not discretionary" and hence subject to the citizens' standing provision. For example, if issuing
regulations to counter external threats to the national parks were deemed "not discretionary," then the potential number of private lawsuits facing the Secretary would be
overwhelming. One way to limit this potential liability would be to narrow the Secretary's nondiscretionary regulation-issuing duties to dealing with the "fifty most critical"
threats as determined jointly by the Secretary and Congress. See supra note 140 and
accompanying text.
161 Professor Sax has suggested that the National Park Service be given regulatory
authority to curb only "nuisance-like" activities beyond park boundaries. Sax, Helpless
Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REv.
162

239, 250-53 (1976).

See supra notes 90 & 149 and text accompanying notes 149-51.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
"One objective is to provide supervision that emphasizes broad questions of
fairness. Another objective is to combine supervision with restraint, making the courts a
genuine kind of partner with the agency in the overall administrative process."
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REv. 509, 554 (1974).
167 See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
164
165
166
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It is true, however, that this proposal may be subject to the same
criticism that was raised against H.R. 2379 during the committee and
House debates of that bill: regulating private activity on land adjacent
to the national parks may interfere with the legitimate local interest in
economic growth.'
These conflicts between national park and local
economic interests are inevitable. This proposal ensures, however, that
the resolution of these conflicts will occur through the observance of
equitable and judicially reviewable procedures." 9
CONCLUSION

This Comment has examined and assessed the viability of several
alternatives for protecting the national parks from developments outside
their borders that adversely affect the parks themselves. Nuisance law
and the doctrine of public trust are two sources for such protection that
have been used with some success recently. Although the nuisance and
public trust doctrines have potential for involving courts in the process
of protecting parks from threats beyond their borders, truly effective
protection is likely to come only via congressional legislation. The
Comment has asserted that existing and proposed legislation is inadequate for coping with these threats. Congress, however, might provide
adequate protection for the parks by carefully delineating the duties
and authority of the Secretary of the Interior to deal with such developments. Court interpretations of the United States Constitution have indicated that Congress is vested with the power to provide for the protection of the public lands. It remains with Congress effectively to
implement that power to protect the nation's culturally significant and
unique natural lands from deterioration.

See supra note 126 and text accompanying notes 125-29.
"' In addition to the methods of review described in this proposal, an aggrieved
state is free to claim that the Secretary's action interferes with powers reserved to the
states by the tenth amendment. Such a claim was raised unsuccessfully by the state of
Minnesota in the Block case. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
1

